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data 
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Abstract 
 
Although both the academic and policy communities have attached great importance to 
measuring corruption, most of the currently available measures are biased and too broad to 
test theory or guide policy. This article proposes a new composite indicator of grand 
corruption based on a wide range of elementary indicators. These indicators are derived 
from a rich qualitative evidence on public procurement corruption and a statistical analysis 
of a public procurement data in Hungary. The composite indicator is constructed by linking 
public procurement process ‘red flags’ to restrictions of market access. This method utilizes 
administrative data that is available in practically every developed country and avoids the 
pitfalls both of perception based indicators and previous ‘objective’ measures of corruption. 
It creates an estimation of institutionalised grand corruption that is consistent over time 
and across countries. The composite indicator is validated using company profitability and 
political connections data. 
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A magas szintű korrupció anatómiája:  
objektív adatokon nyugvó kompozit korrupciós 
kockázati index 
 
Fazekas Mihály – Tóth István János – Lawrence Peter King 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Jóllehet mind az akadémiai kutatások, mind a döntéshozók nagy jelentőséget 
tulajdonítanak a korrupció mérésének, a legtöbb rendelkezésre álló indikátor torzított és 
túlságosan általános elméletek teszteléséhez, vagy döntések támogatásához. A tanulmány 
egy új kompozit korrupciós indikátort vezet be, amely egy sor elemi korrupciós indikátorra 
épül. Ezek az indikátorok a közbeszerzési korrupció kvalitatív elemzéséből és a magyar 
közbeszerzési adatbázis statisztikai elemzéséből származnak. A kompozit indikátort a 
közbeszerzési ’vörös zászlók’ vagy ’red flags’ és a piaci verseny korlátozására mutató 
indikátorok összekapcsolásával képeztük. Ez a megközelítés adminisztratív adatokat használ 
föl, melyek rendelkezésre állnak gyakorlatilag minden fejlett országban, továbbá elkerüli 
mind a percepciós, mind a korábbi ’objektív’ indikátorok jellemző hibáit. Az intézményesült 
magas szintű korrupció becslése konzisztens mind időben, mind országok között. A 
kompozit indikátor jóságát nyertes cégek profitabilitása és politikai kapcsolatainak 
segítségével teszteljük. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: közbeszerzés, magas szintű korrupció, korrupciós technika, kompozit 
korrupciós index 
 
 
JEL kód: D72, D73, H57 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Various corruption indices have received considerable academic, policy, and media 
attention, at least partially due to the central role the underlying phenomena play in the 
quality of democratic governance, the provision of public goods, economic growth, and 
equality. Understanding their importance, some international organisations regularly 
monitor corruption in their member countries (European Commission, 2011a) and even tie 
funding to performance on governance indicators including corruption (Andersson & 
Heywood, 2009; Radelet, 2002, 2003). 
In the absence of robust objective measures, there are three major sources of corruption 
indicators to date: 1) surveys of corruption perceptions and attitudes (which are most widely 
used); 2) reviews of institutional and legal frameworks; and 3) detailed analyses and audits 
of individual cases. Unfortunately, each of these has serious deficiencies leaving us without 
any reasonably reliable and valid indicator of corruption allowing for comparing countries 
over time or exploring within country diversity. 
In order to fill some of the gap between the demand for corruption indices and the dire 
state of the data currently available, the goal of this paper is to develop a novel measure of 
institutionalised grand corruption which:  
1. solely derives from objective data describing behaviour,  
2. is defined on the micro level such as individual transactions, 
3. allows for consistent temporal comparisons within and across countries, and 
4. rests on a thorough understanding of the corrupt rent extraction process. 
In the context of public procurement, institutionalised grand corruption or legal 
corruption refer to the allocation and performance of public procurement contracts by 
bending prior explicit rules and principles of good public procurement in order to benefit a 
closed network while denying access to all others (for a related discussion see Kaufmann & 
Vincente, 2011; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009; Rothstein & 
Teorell, 2008). 
The proposed indicator of institutionalised grand corruption fulfils all of the above 
criteria with potential for replication in most developed countries including every EU 
member state, Russia, and the US. Time series available in these countries range between 6-
8 years. The approach makes use of micro-level data on individual public procurement 
procedures allowing for directly modelling corrupt actors’ rent extraction activities. 
Institutionalised grand corruption in public procurement requires 1) the generation of 
corrupt rents and 2) the regular extraction of such rents. To achieve both of these, any 
corrupt group has to restrict competition prescribed by procurement laws to benefit a 
 
6 
 
particular bidder multiple times. Hence, measuring the degree of competition restriction, 
recurrent contract awards to the same company, and the typical techniques used to achieve 
these goals allow for detecting institutionalised grand corruption consistently across 
countries, organisations and time. 
The paper is structured as the follows: first, the literature on corruption measurement is 
reviewed; second, the proposed novel measurement approach is presented; third, Hungarian 
data and variables are summarized; fourth, the composite corruption risk index is 
constructed and some external validity measures offered; finally, conclusions and further 
research directions are provided. 
2.  LITERATURE ON MEASURING GRAND CORRUPTION 
By now, an industry has emerged for measuring corruption. However, the available 
measurements are either fundamentally flawed or too narrow for testing theories of grand 
corruption and developing effective solutions to it. 
In a broad sense, corruption indicators derive primarily from: 
 Surveys of attitudes, perceptions and experiences of corruption among different 
stakeholders (e.g. general population, firms, experts); 
 Reviews of institutional features controlling corruption in countries or individual 
organisations; and 
 Audits and investigations of individual cases (see Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2006; Transparency International, 2012). 
Among perception and attitude surveys, the two most widely used are the World Bank’s 
Control of Corruption (Kaufmann, Mastruzzi, & Kraay, 2010) and Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index1. Both of these have received extensive 
criticism applicable to any similar survey (Andersson & Heywood, 2009; Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Mastruzzi, 2007; Kurtz & Schrank, 2007a, 2007b; Lambsdorff, 2006). Without trying to 
be exhaustive, some of the key arguments include: perceptions may or may not be related to 
actual experience (Rose & Peiffer, 2012), they can be driven by general sentiment reflecting, 
for example economic growth (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007a) or media coverage of high profile 
corruption cases (Golden & Picci, 2005). Arguably, perceptions of grand corruption are even 
more unreliable than perceptions of everyday corruption since experts and citizens have 
almost no direct experience of this type of corruption. As both indicators and others of this 
type primarily derive from non-representative surveys, representativeness bias is likely to 
occur, in addition to reflexivity bias (i.e. respondents influenced by prior and future 
                                                        
1 http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/ (accessed: 16/1/2013) 
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measurements) exaggerated by small sample sizes (Golden & Picci, 2005). These indicators 
vary surprisingly little over time given the large changes in underlying governance structures 
suggesting that they are too insensitive to change (Arndt & Oman, 2006; Kurtz & Schrank, 
2007a; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011). 
Surveys of experiences with corruption, that is low-level bribery, such as the Quality of 
Government Institute’s regional survey  (Charron, Dijkstra, & Lapuente, 2010) or surveys in 
Latin American countries (Seligson, 2002) while addressing some of the weaknesses of 
perception surveys fall short of a sufficient data source. A prime problem is non-response or 
false response to sensitive questions such as giving or receiving bribes. Most importantly, 
only a tiny fraction of the population has direct experience with grand corruption limiting 
the use of this method. 
Reviews of institutions controlling corruption, while crucial in understanding the 
determinants of corruption, are, by design, not measuring corruption directly. In the absence 
of a precisely measured outcome variable, they have to rely on untested theories of which 
institutional features work. 
Analyses of individual cases are highly reliable in establishing and explaining both petty 
and grand corruption, however, their narrow scope and lack of generalizability make them of 
only limited use for comparative purposes.  
2.1 OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF CORRUPTION 
Some authors recognising the deficiencies of the above indicators have embarked on 
developing objective measures which rely on directly observable, hard indicators of 
behaviour that likely indicate corrupt behaviour (Table 1). These studies look into corruption 
in various contexts such as elections and high level politics or welfare services and 
redistributive politics. For example Olken (2007) uses independent engineers to review road 
projects and calculates the amount and value of missing inputs to determine corruption. 
More closely associated with our approach are those studies which focus on corruption in 
public procurement and bidding markets. For example, Golden & Picci (2005) propose a new 
measure of corruption based on the difference between the quantity of infrastructure and 
public spending on it. Other authors use some indicators also part of our composite indicator 
such as the use of exceptional procedure types (Auriol, Flochel, & Straub, 2011) or explicit 
scoring rules (Hyytinen, Lundberg, & Toivanen, 2008) or political connections of winning 
companies (Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2013). 
While these papers inspired our approach and point in the right direction, they cannot 
readily be scaled up to allow for temporal comparisons across countries and organisations. 
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The reason is that they rely on a too narrow single indicator which may or may not be the 
primary vehicle for corrupt rent extraction depending on the regulatory framework in place 
(Olken & Pande, 2012). For example, corruption linked to exceptional procedure types may 
be easily removed by simply deleting the procedure from the procurement law, however it is 
unlikely that this alone would change the underlying corrupt phenomena much (Auriol et al., 
2011). Instead, these and further elementary indicators have to be combined for meaningful 
temporal international comparisons. 
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Table 1. Summary of selected studies using objective indicators of corruption 
paper indicator used Country year sector potential for international comparison 
part of 
CRI* 
(Auriol et al., 
2011) 
Exceptional procedure type Paraguay 2004-2007 
general 
procurement 
HIGH 
If procedure definitions can be aligned, international 
comparisons can be made widely 
Yes 
(Bandiera, Prat, 
& Valletti, 2009) 
Price differentials for standard goods 
purchased locally or through a national 
procurement agency 
Italy 2000-2005 
various 
standardized 
goods (e.g. 
paper) 
LOW 
Price data is not readily available in most countries, many 
countries don't have national procurement agencies, national 
procurement agencies are likely to be captured in many 
countries. 
No 
(Coviello & 
Gagliarducci, 
2010) 
Number of bidders 
Same firm awarded contracts recurrently 
Level of competition 
Italy 2000-2005 
general 
procurement 
HIGH 
Number of bidders, recurrent contract award, and 
competitiveness of bids are available in many countries. 
Yes 
(Di Tella & 
Schargrodsky, 
2003) 
Difference in prices of standardized 
products such as ethyl alcohol 
Brazil 1996-1997 health care 
MEDIUM 
Detailed product-level price and quantity information is not 
readily available across many countries, but can be collected. 
No 
(Ferraz & Finan, 
2008) 
Corruption uncovered by federal audits 
of local government finances 
Brazil 2003 
federal-local 
transfers 
LOW 
high quality audits, not influenced by powerful corrupt groups 
are unlikely to be available in many countries. 
No 
(Golden & Picci, 
2005) 
Ratio of physical stock of infrastructure 
to cumulative spending on infrastructure 
Italy 1997 infrastructure 
MEDIUM 
It is hard  to compute comparable value of the stock of physical 
capital across countries different in the quality of infrastructure 
and geography. 
No 
(Goldman et al., 
2013) 
Political office holders' position on 
company boards 
USA 1990-2004 
general 
procurement 
HIGH 
Company contract volumes can be estimated in many countries 
and publicly listed companies political connections can be traced 
relatively easily. 
No** 
(Hyytinen et al., 
2008) 
Number and type of invited firms 
Use of restricted procedure 
Sweden 1990-1998 cleaning services 
HIGH 
Both number of bidders and procedure types are readily 
available in many countries. 
Yes 
(Olken, 2006) 
Difference between the quantity of in-
kind benefits (rice) received according to 
official records and reported survey 
evidence 
Indonesia 1998-1999 
welfare 
spending 
MEDIUM 
It is possible to design user surveys across a wide range of 
countries to track actual receipts, although it may be expensive. 
No 
(Olken, 2007) 
Differences between the officially 
reported and independently audited 
prices and quantities of road 
construction projects  
Indonesia 2003-2004 
infrastructure 
(roads) 
LOW 
Auditing large numbers of projects by independent engineers is 
costly and unlikely to allow for cross-country comparisons. 
No 
(Reinikka & 
Svensson, 2004) 
Difference between block grants received 
by schools according to official records 
and user survey 
Uganda 1991-1995 education 
MEDIUM 
It is possible to design user surveys across a wide range of 
countries to track actual receipts, although it may be expensive. 
No 
*CRI=Corruption Risk Index, developed in this paper; **This approach is utilized in (Fazekas, Tóth, & King, 2013a). 
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3.  THE MEASUREMENT APPROACH 
3.1 CORRUPT RENT EXTRACTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
Institutionalised corruption’s primary aim is earning corruption rents. Corruption rents in 
public procurement can be earned if and only if the winning contractor is a pre-selected 
company which earns extra profit due to higher than market price for the delivered quantity 
and/or quality. 
The winning company has to be pre-selected in order to control rent extraction in an 
institutionalised manner. This rules out occasional corruption where the company is lured 
into corruption during the public procurement process. Extra profit has to be realised in 
order to create the pot of money from which rents can be paid. 
In order to adequately measure extra profit; price, delivered quantity, and quality of 
deliveries has to be known with high precision. However, none of these three can adequately 
be measured. Price and quantity are publicly available, but they are comparable only for 
homogenous products such as electricity without laborious case-by-case analysis and even 
then it is difficult to arrive at accurate estimates. Quality cannot be reliably observed in 
official records without using expensive expert knowledge. Hence, we can only measure the 
process of awarding contracts to pre-selected companies.  
Competition has to be eliminated or tilted in order to award the contract to the pre-
selected company. Bypassing competition can be done in three primary forms, each 
corresponding to a phase of the public procurement process: 
1. Limiting the set of bidders: submission phase; 
2. Unfairly assessing bidders: assessment phase; and 
3. Ex-post modifying conditions of performance2: delivery phase. 
On the one hand, these three elementary corruption strategies can be combined in any 
way to reach the final desired outcome. For example, some bidders may be excluded with a 
tightly tailored eligibility criteria while the remaining unwanted bidders can simply be 
unfairly scored on subjective scoring items. On the other hand, once the desired outcome has 
been achieved at a given stage, there is no need for further corrupt actions which would 
increase the risk of detection with no additional benefit. For example, if the only company 
                                                        
2 While modifying contract conditions does not belong to the set of company selection techniques, it 
can be part of an arsenal supporting the selection of the ‘right’ company. For example, the pre-
selected company wins in a competitive process by promising low price and high quality knowing 
that later contract modifications will allow it to earn the agreed corruption rent. 
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submitting a valid bid is the pre-selected company there is no need to modify contract 
content later to increase price. 
3.2 MEASUREMENT MODEL 
Utilizing a public procurement database (for details see section 4), it is possible to measure a 
host of elementary indicators in relation to each of the above three stages of public 
procurement from which a composite indicator can be built (Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2013a).  
In order to most adequately model the company selection process, measurement is carried 
out on the level of individual contract award. Later, aggregation to organisation level per 
year can also be carried out to link procurement data to company profitability for example. 
Likely outcomes of corrupt procurement procedures are defined for each of the above 
three main phases (see section 5.1). Indicators of likely corruption techniques to achieve 
these outcomes in each phase are also defined, which constitute the inputs for corrupt 
contract award and completion (see Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2013b). 
The corrupt contract award process is modelled using multiple regression linking likely 
corruption inputs (e.g. eligibility criteria tailored to one company) to likely corruption 
outcomes (e.g. only one company submitting a bid) in the presence of variables controlling 
for alternative explanations (e.g. number of competitors on the market). Our models linking 
corrupt inputs to outcomes in public procurement explain recurrent contract award to a pre-
selected company with those corruption techniques which typically serve as means for 
corruptly eliminating competitors (Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2013a). 
The explanatory model linking corruption inputs to outcomes delivers a set of 
coefficients which represent the strength of association between each underlying likely 
corruption input and likely corruption outcome. Reliability of elementary corruption 
indicators is defined using their regression coefficients, as those corruption inputs which are 
more powerful in predicting probable corruption outcomes are more likely to signal 
corruption rather than noise. Falsely indicating corruption is minimised by dropping those 
indicators which didn’t prove to be powerful and significant predictors in the model and 
assigning lower component weights to those whose effect is only moderate.  
In each country’s composite indicator, corruption outcomes, having no regression 
coefficients, receive weight of 1 reflecting their benchmark status in modelling the 
corruption process. Corruption outcomes measure most directly the underlying corrupt 
transactions hence their benchmark status. If overall model fit is adequate (i.e. passes 
standard tests of significance), the underlying model structure is verified supporting the 
conclusion that corruption outcome indicators are adequate themselves. Every powerful-
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enough corruption input receives a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting the size of its 
regression coefficient. This means that all weights are scaled compared to corruption 
outcomes.  
For comparison across time and countries, both the list of components and component 
weights are kept constant unless there are differences in the institutional setup warranting 
any deviation. This is because some corruption inputs may be unused in some countries 
while widely used in others. Giving these different weights maximises the validity of the 
composite indicator while keeping measurement consistent across time and countries. As 
corruption techniques can substitute for each other, the different component weights reflect 
institutional features impacting on the form not the substance of institutionalised grand 
corruption (For details of comparative CRI see Fazekas, Chvalkovská, Skuhrovec, Tóth, & 
King, 2013). 
Using the weights obtained from the measurement model, elementary indicators are 
simply summed to produce the corruption risk composite indicator of individual 
transactions. Summation reflects the view that any of the elementary corruption techniques 
is sufficient on its own to render a procedure corrupt; while multiple signs of corruption 
indicate higher corruption risks. Hence, we suggest the following formula for the composite 
indicator: 
 CRIt = Σj wj * CIi t  (1) 
 Σj wj = 1 (2) 
 0 ≤ CRIt ≤ 1 (3) 
 0 ≤ CIjt ≤ 1 (4) 
where CRIt stands for the corruption risk index of transaction t, CIj t represents the jth 
elementary corruption indicator observed in transaction t, and wj represents the weight of 
elementary corruption indicator j. Elementary corruption indicators can be either corruption 
inputs or outputs. 
Higher level units’ such as organisations’ CRI can be obtained by calculating the 
arithmetic average of their transactions’ CRI in a given period (it is also possible to use 
contract values for weighting). The added value of aggregating CRI to a higher unit of 
observation such as an issuer of tenders is that it further increases our confidence in CRI. An 
organisation consistently displaying high CRI over time is likely to be actually a corrupt 
organisation rather than simply a victim of random fluctuations in the data. 
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4. DATA 
The database derives from Hungarian public procurement announcements of 2009-2012 
(this database is referred to as PP henceforth). The data represent a complete database of all 
public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement Law. PP 
contains variables appearing in 1) calls for tenders, 2) contract award notices, 3) contract 
modification notices, 4) contract completion announcements, and 5) administrative 
corrections notices. As not all of these kinds of announcements appear for each procedure, 
for example depending on procedure type, we only have the variables deriving from contract 
award notices consistently across every procedure. Comparable data sets exist or can be 
constructed from public records in all EU countries, the USA, and Russia for the last 6-8 
years (Annex A with details). 
The place of publication of these documents is the Public Procurement Bulletin which 
appears is accessible online3. As there is no readily available database, we used a crawler 
algorithm to capture the text of every announcement. Then, applying a complex automatic 
and manual text mining strategy, we created a structured database which contains variables 
with clear meaning and well-defined categories. As the original texts available online contain 
a range of errors, inconsistencies, and omissions, we applied several correction measures to 
arrive at a database of sufficient quality for scientific research. For a full description of 
database development, see Fazekas & Tóth (2012a) in Hungarian and in somewhat less detail 
Fazekas & Tóth (2012b) in English. 
A potential limitation of our database is that it only contains information on public 
procurement procedures under the Hungarian Public Procurement Law as there is no central 
depository of other contracts. The law defines the minimum estimated contract value for its 
application depending on the type of announcing body and the kind of products or services 
to be procured (for example, from 1 January 2012, classical issuers have to follow the 
national regulations if they procure services for more than 8 million HUF or 27 thousand 
EUR). By implication, PP is a biased sample of total Hungarian public procurement of the 
period, containing only the larger and more heavily regulated cases. This bias makes PP well 
suited for studying more costly and more high stakes corruption where coverage is close to 
complete. Although, as removing contracts from the remit of the Public Procurement Law 
can in itself be part of corrupt strategies there remains some non-random bias in the data 
(for an estimation of this bias see (Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2013b) and Figure 6 below). 
 
                                                        
3 See: http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/nid/KE (in Hungarian) 
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As contract award notices represent the most important part of a procedure’s life-cycle 
and they are published for each procedure under the Hungarian Public Procurement Law, 
their statistics are shown in Table 2 to give an overview of the database. It is noticeable that 
number and total value of contracts awarded has declined in the observation period. This is 
due to two parallel developments: 1) because of budget cuts since 2010, total public spending 
has declined; and 2) public procurement transparency has decreased since the new 
government entered office in 2010 (we will return to this point in section 6). 
Table 2.  
Main statistics of the analysed data – contracts 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Total number of contracts awarded 10918 17914 14070 10342 53244 
Total number of unique winners 3987 5617 5587 4923 13557 
Total number of unique issuers 1718 2871 2808 2344 5519 
Combined value of awarded contracts (million 
EUR) * 
4604 3834 1856 1298 11592 
Source: PP 
Notes: * = a 300 HUR/EUR uniform exchange rate was applied for exchanging HUF values. 
 
5. BUILDING BLOCKS: THE CORRUPTION PROCESS’ OUTCOMES AND 
INPUTS 
5.1 INDICATORS OF CORRUPTION OUTCOMES 
The key outcome of institutionalised corruption in public procurement, which we are 
measuring here, is contract performance by a pre-selected company. This corruption 
outcome can be secured at the procurement process’ 
1. Submission phase: only the pre-selected bidder submits a bid; or 
2. Assessment phase: contract award to the pre-selected bidder; 
As it is extremely rare that the company awarded a contract is changed during the 
delivery phase, the corruption outcome at the delivery phase4 could be treated as fully 
determined by phases 1 and 2. Three outcome indicators are proposed to capture the full 
scale of institutionalised public procurement corruption where outcomes of any prior stage 
also serve as an inputs to later stages (Table 3). The corrupt outcome of the submission 
phase - only the pre-selected bidder submits a bid – is indicated by whether a single bid was 
submitted to the tender. In single submitted bid contracts, the issuer has an exceptionally 
                                                        
4 If corruption is not institutionalised the delivery phase may well be the location of forming corrupt 
links. This, however, falls outside the remit of our measurement model. 
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large leeway to award the contract in a way which serves corrupt rent extraction. The corrupt 
outcome of the assessment phase - contract award to the pre-selected bidder – can only 
partially be captured by a quantitative indicator: exclusion of all but one received bid. Much 
of the award process such as scoring bidders is not extensively reported in public records 
hence the lack of further direct outcome indicators. In order to capture the final corruption 
outcome more appropriately, a further indicator is proposed which signals repeated contract 
award to the same company throughout multiple procedures: winner’s share of issuer’s 
contracts during the 12 month period before the contract award in question. 
Table 3.  
Summary of outcome indicators 
phase indicator name Definition 
submission single bidder 1=1 bid received, 0=more than 1 bid received 
assessment exclusion of bids 
1=1 bid NOT excluded, 0=more than1 bid NOT 
excluded 
overall 
winner’s share of 
issuer’s contracts 
12-month total contract value of winner / 12-month 
total awarded contract value (by issuer) 
 
5.1.1 Single bidder 
Issuers of tenders are free to choose the bidder of their preference; however, they are 
prescribed to maximise value for money, most importantly through soliciting competing 
bids. Corruption arises when competition is blocked in order to earn corruption rent. The 
most obvious signal that there was absolutely no competition for a public contract is when a 
tender received only 1 bid. Interview evidence from Hungary suggests that tenders with only 
2-3 bids are also highly likely to be prone to corruption, as one public procurement adviser 
working in the industry for over a decade put it: “it is easy, just bring two friends with whom 
we can agree on the exact content of their bids”. Focusing only on single bidder contracts is, 
therefore, a conservative approach in line with the goal of delivering a lower bound estimate 
of large-scale corruption.  
There are two potential criticisms to this indicator: 1) The single bidder indicator also 
signals corruption in cases when there was truly only one bidder capable of performing the 
task, but no corruption took place. While this is a serious weakness of the indicator, it is 
considered to be only of marginal magnitude as the overwhelming majority of products 
procured by governments are ordinary and widely produced such as office stationery, cars, 
national roads, or IT support services (less than 5% of contracts were awarded on markets 
with 3 or fewer companies). In addition, robustness checks of our models, excluding markets 
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with a small number of competitors, warrant that this concern is of minor importance. 2) 
Some authors contend that a single bidder has no incentive to give a bribe (Soreide, 2002). 
However, in an environment of systemic corruption, a single bidder tender is the ideal 
outcome created by colluding bidders and issuers, especially if the same single bidder wins 
contracts repeatedly (see section 5.1.3). 
5.1.2 Exclusion of all but one bidder 
It is possible that a corrupt issuer didn’t manage to deter all but one bidder from submitting 
a bid, in which case it can still award the contract to the ‘well-connected’ bidder if it manages 
1) to exclude the bids of all unwanted bidders on administrative or formal grounds (Heggstad 
& Froystad, 2011); or 2) to unfairly assess the bids to favour a particular bidder. As there is 
no direct evidence available in public records for the latter, the assessment phase’s 
corruption outcome indicator captures only the former. Having a single valid bid tender can 
be heavily associated with corruption for, by and large, the same reasons as for single 
submitted bid (see section 5.1.1). Counter-arguments follow the same lines too. This 
similarity between the two measures, while conveying additional information, is also 
supported by regression results (Table 9). 
5.1.3 Winner’s share of issuer’s contracts 
While there is no separate indicator for the delivery phase, we develop a likely corruption 
outcome measure for the public procurement corruption process as a whole. The ultimate 
goal of large-scale institutionalised corruption is to repeatedly award contracts to the same 
company or companies controlled by the corrupt group (Heggstad & Froystad, 2011). By 
implication, winner’s share of issuer’s contracts indicates the likelihood of such corruption. 
As the primary location of collusion and capture is the individual public organisation 
disbursing public funds, this variable is defined as the ratio of contract value the winner won 
from a given issuer to the total value of contracts awarded by the given issuer throughout a 
12-month period.  
Using winner’s share within issuer’s contracts (or winner’s contract share as we will call 
it to remain succinct) as corruption indicator is likely to suffer from disturbances in periods 
when a new dominant group takes control of public organisations with its new clientele, for 
example when a new government comes into office. Changes of dominant, captor groups are 
expected to be rare events, hence, this downward bias may only be moderate (and controlling 
for year of contract award in the below regressions captures much of this potential bias). 
Moreover, this indicator also underestimates corruption when the corrupt network uses 
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multiple companies for extracting rents. Interviews indicate that combining company 
ownership groups’ contract volumes accounts for most of this bias.5 
Table 4. 
 Descriptive statistics for the three outcome variables, 2009-2012,  
markets with at least 3 competitors 
 
mean min max 
st. 
deviation 
N 
single received bid 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.46 51012 
single valid bid 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.48 41277 
winner’s share of issuer’s 
contracts 
0.31 0.00 1.00 0.40 37399 
Source: PP 
5.2 INDICATORS OF CORRUPTION INPUTS 
According to our measurement model, the above outlined likely outcomes of the corruption 
process at least partially result from corruption techniques such as tailoring eligibility 
criteria to one company. These corruption techniques are interpreted as corruption inputs to 
the corruption process in public procurement which aims at purporting institutionalised 
grand corruption. A much wider set of corruption techniques in public procurement and 
their expected effects are extensively discussed in Fazekas et al. (2013)6. This section only 
provides a brief summary of 1) those factors which turned out to be powerful predictors in 
the below regressions in line with our prior expectations; and 2) of the theoretical 
expectations linking each input to each outcome. 
14 input factors7 are considered when building the models accounting for outcomes of the 
corruption process (variable definitions in Table 5, descriptive statistics in 
                                                        
5 A further potential bias comes from collusion between bidding firms which tends to be based on 
product market rather than public organisation, hence it is deemed a relatively minor problem. An 
ongoing research project of the authors aims at separating corruption from cartel which is expected 
to deliver high quality evidence on this potential bias. 
6 Fazekas et al. (2013) discusses these indicators already applied to a group of contracts such as 
contracts awarded by an issuer over a period of time, while here they are interpreted on contract-
level. This is only a formal difference without changing the logic of analysis.  
7 Note that single bidder contract is both an outcome of the submission phase as well as an input to 
the corruption process at later procurement stages. 
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Table 6and Table 7). These capture key characteristics of the public procurement process 
from the beginning of the submission phase until the end of delivery.  
Table 5.  
Summary of corruption inputs (higher score indicates greater  
likelihood of corruption) 
phase indicator name indicator definition 
submission 
Single bidder contract 
0=more than one bid received  
1=ONE bid received 
Call for tender not 
published in official journal 
0=call for tender published in official 
journal 
1=NO call for tenders published in official 
journal 
Procedure type 
0 =open procedure 
1=invitation procedure 
2=negotiation procedure 
3=other procedures (e.g. competitive 
dialogue) 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 
Length of eligibility criteria 
number of characters of the eligibility 
criteria MINUS average number of 
characters of the given market's eligibility 
criteria 
Length of submission 
period 
number of days between publication of call 
for tenders and submission deadline 
Relative price of tender 
documentation 
price of tender documentation DIVIDED 
BY contract value 
Call for tenders 
modification 
0=call for tenders NOT modified 
1=call for tenders modified 
assessment 
Exclusion of all but one bid 
0=at least two bids NOT excluded  
1=all but one bid excluded 
Weight of non-price 
evaluation criteria 
proportion of NON-price related 
evaluation criteria within all criteria 
Annulled procedure re-
launched subsequently* 
0=contract awarded in a NON-annulled 
procedure  
1=contract awarded in procedure annulled, 
but re-launched 
Length of decision period 
number of working days between 
submission deadline and announcing 
contract award 
delivery 
Contract modification 
0=contract NOT modified during delivery  
1=contract modified during delivery 
Contract lengthening 
relative contract extension (days of 
extension/days of contract length) 
Contract value increase 
relative contract price increase (change in 
contract value/original, contracted 
contract value) 
* Combining annulations by the issuer and the courts 
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Following from the discussion in (Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2013b) specific expectations are 
formulated linking each input to each output (Table 8). Single received bid and single valid 
bid outcomes are discussed jointly because the theoretical considerations are very similar 
and the regressions unravel largely the same findings.  
The expectations are formulated in a general linear form, for example, the shorter the 
submission period is the more likely that only one bid was received. However, many of the 
continuous variables are indeed not a continuous measure of corruption risks, rather there 
are critical thresholds beyond which corruption risks greatly increase. For example, a 
submission period of 5 days compared to 15 days is likely to convey higher corruption risks 
while a submission period of 35 days compared to 45 days may carry little to no information 
regarding corruption. By implication, behind any of our linear hypotheses lies the 
expectation of finding the thresholds which best capture spikes in the probability of a 
corruption outcome hence corruption risks. 
In every case, the input variables are defined in a way that their higher values are 
expected to signal higher corruption risks. However, some of the corruption inputs are 
typically used as ‘corrective action’ later on in the procurement process to fix the failed 
attempts at bending competition earlier. These factors are expected to have negative 
association with corruption outcomes of earlier stages. For example, if only the well-
connected company submitted a bid there is no need for subsequently modifying the 
contract as the corrupt bidder could set the price and quality allowing for corrupt rent 
extraction. However, if there was real competition at the submission phase the well-
connected bidder is likely to be forced to submit a competitive bid with little scope for 
earning extra profit; hence the need for subsequent contract modification. 
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Table 6. 
 Descriptive statistics of corruption inputs, 2009-2012,  
markets with at least 3 unique winners 
 
mean min max sd N 
Single bidder contract 0.301 0.00 1.00 0.46 51012 
Exclusion of all but one bid 0.367 0.00 1.00 0.48 41277 
Call for tender not published in official 
journal 
0.388 0.00 1.00 0.49 51823 
Length of submission period 10.842 
-
7594.84 
21594.88 3266.15 29215 
Relative price of tender documentation 0.003 0.00 0.20 0.01 16743 
Call for tenders modification 0.109 0.00 1.00 0.31 31726 
Annulled procedure re-launched 
subsequently 
0.061 0.00 1.00 0.24 55217 
Weight of non-price evaluation criteria 0.216 0.00 1.00 0.33 51823 
Length of decision period 90.871 0.00 1004.00 120.24 28605 
Contract modification 0.189 0.00 1.00 0.39 51823 
Contract lengthening 0.014 -0.97 30.29 0.26 16238 
Contract value increase 0.079 -0.80 5.00 0.53 6547 
Source: PP 
 
Table 7.  
Distribution of procedure type, 2009-2012,  
markets with at least 3 unique winners 
 
N % 
open 31,007 59.83 
invitation 906 1.75 
negotiation 9,510 18.35 
other 5,760 11.11 
missing/error 4,640 8.95 
Total 51,823 100 
Source: PP 
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Table 8. Summary of the expected direction of and grounds for the relationships between corruption inputs and outputs 
Phase INPUT/OUTPUT 
single received / valid bid winner’s share within issuer’s contracts 
direction reason direction reason 
Submis-
sion 
Single bidder contract 
not 
relevant 
not relevant + 
Single received bid contracts make it easier for issuers to repeatedly award 
contracts to the same well-connected company. 
Call for tender not 
published in official 
journal 
+ 
Not publishing the call for tenders in the official journal makes it less likely 
that eligible bidders notice the bidding opportunity and bid. 
+ 
Not publishing the call for tenders in the official journal weakens competition 
allowing the issuer to more easily award contracts repeatedly to a well-
connected company. 
Procedure type + 
Non-open procedures, which are less transparent and require less open 
competition, create more opportunities to limit the range of bids received 
and to exclude bids. 
+ 
Non-open procedures, which are less transparent and require less open 
competition, create more opportunities for issuers to repeatedly award 
contracts to the same well-connected company. 
Length of eligibility 
criteria 
+ 
Lengthy, hence complex, eligibility criteria allows issuers to tailor the tender 
to a single company and to exclude unwanted bids. 
+ 
Lengthy, hence complex, eligibility criteria allows issuers to benefit a well-
connected company, for example by keeping less competitive bidders in 
competition. 
Exceptionally short 
submission period 
+ 
A short submission period leaves less time hence make it harder for non-
connected companies to bid and to submit a bid. 
+ 
A short submission period leaves less time hence make it harder for non-
connected companies to bid successfully whereas a well-connected firm can 
use its inside knowledge to win repeatedly. 
Relative price of 
documentation 
+ 
Relatively expensive tender documentation makes bidding more expensive 
and hence deters bidders from bidding except for the well-connected 
company which is close to certain of its success. 
+ 
Relatively pricey tender documentation weakens competition allowing the 
issuer to more easily award contracts repeatedly to a well-connected 
company. 
Call for tenders 
modification 
+ 
Modifying call for tenders allows for excluding unwanted bidders by 
changing eligibility criteria once the interested bidders are known. 
+ 
Strategic modification of the call for tenders favours the well-connected 
company further increasing its market share. 
Assess-
ment 
Exclusion of all but one 
bid 
not 
relevant 
not relevant + 
Single valid bid contracts make it easier for issuers to repeatedly award 
contracts to the same well-connected company. 
Weight of non-price 
evaluation criteria 
+ 
Non-price related evaluation criteria tend to be more subjective, allowing 
issuers to favour the well-connected company. Apparently unfair assessment 
criteria deters bidders. 
+ 
Non-price related evaluation criteria tend to be more subjective, allowing 
issuers to favour the well-connected company, hence repeatedly awarding 
contracts to the same company. 
Annulled procedure re-
launched 
subsequently* 
- 
If unwanted bidders couldn't be deterred from bidding and their bids 
couldn't be excluded, annulling and subsequently re-launching the tender 
allows issuer to correct its failed attempt to eliminate competition. 
+ 
If unwanted bidders couldn't be deterred from bidding and their bids 
couldn't be excluded, annulling and subsequently re-launching the tender 
allows issuer to more successfully award the contract to a well-connected 
company. 
Length of decision 
period 
+ 
Overly lengthy decision period signals extensive legal challenges to the 
tender, suggesting that the issuer attempted to limit competition. 
+ 
Lengthy decision periods signal extensive legal challenge to the tender, 
suggesting that the issuer wants to award the contract to a well-connected 
company. 
Delivery 
Contract modification - 
If competition couldn't be eliminated, the well-connected firm can still win 
with a competitive offer, but subsequent contract modification(s) still allow it 
to collect extra profit. 
+ 
Contract modification(s) suggests that the issuer corruptly favour a well-
connected company, potentially repeatedly. 
Contract lengthening - 
If competition couldn't be eliminated, the well-connected firm can still win 
with a competitive offer, but subsequent contract lengthening still allows it to 
collect extra profit. 
+ 
A contract lengthening suggests that the issuer corruptly favour a well-
connected company, potentially  repeatedly. 
Contract value increase - 
If competition couldn't be eliminated, the well-connected firm can still win 
with a competitive offer, but subsequent contract value increase still allows it 
to collect extra profit. 
+ 
A contract value increase suggests that the issuer corruptly favour a well-
connected company, potentially  repeatedly. 
   
 6. COMPOSITE CORRUPTION RISK INDEX 
This section discusses 1) the regressions modelling institutionalised grand corruption in 
public procurement, 2) derives component weights for composite indicator building, and 3) 
provides validity tests for the resulting composite indicator.  
The regressions’ primary purpose is to validate whether corruption inputs could 
contribute to outputs in line with our theoretical expectations reflecting institutionalised 
grand corruption on the procurement market. They provide the primary source of internal 
validity of the composite indicator. As different phases of the procurement process are 
intertwined with each other, most appropriate analytical technique would be Structural 
Equation Modelling (Hoyle, 2012). However, this technique cannot easily handle large 
numbers of binary variables among dependent and independent variables and many non-
linear relationships, hence, we opted for modelling each stage separately, but using partially 
overlapping variable sets. For outcomes single received bid and single valid bid, we used 
binary logistic regression; while for the winner’s contract share outcome, we used linear 
regression. 
In any regression, a significant and large coefficient is interpreted as indicating that the 
given corruption input is typically used for reaching the corruption output even after taking 
into account alternative explanations, such as contract size or length, and all other 
corruption inputs. This still means that it can be used for other, non-corrupt purposes in 
atypical cases; conversely, all the non-significant and weak explanatory factors may still be 
used for corrupt purposes, albeit only exceptionally. 
Component weights of the composite indicator are derived from regression coefficients; 
whereby, the larger coefficient means higher component weight. This reflects the view that 
the more often a corruption input is used in combination with corruption outcomes the more 
confident we can be that institutionalised grand corruption lies behind its use. 
6.1 MODELLING CORRUPT RENT EXTRACTION: COMPONENT WEIGHTS 
Regression models were built based on the above theoretical expectations by entering each 
corruption input and controls step-by-step. Here, only final regression results are reported 
for the sake of brevity. The regressions are fitted only one markets with at least 3 different 
winners in 2009-2012, that is where there is surely enough adequate competitors present. As 
the validity of all three outcome variables crucially hinges on the availability of suitable 
competitors, robustness checks are presented in Annex B excluding markets with less than 
   
38 and 110 different winners throughout 2009-2012. The conclusions are substantially the 
same on the restricted samples too. 
Thresholds in continuous variables were identified in an iterative process: first, a model 
was fitted using the linear continuous predictor; second, jumps in residual values were 
identified using residual distribution graphs. For example, average residual values of the 
regression using all the control variables plus the linear continuous measure of the relative 
price of documentation for predicting single received bid are depicted in Figure 1, left panel. 
It clearly indicates that there are three distinctive groups of relative document prices. For the 
lowest region, ranging between approximately the 24th and 40th percentiles, the model 
overestimates the probability of a single received bid, while it is the opposite case for the 
region between the 70th and 100th percentiles. These suggest at least three distinct categories. 
The right panel of Figure 1 shows the same residual distribution after the categorical 
measure of relative document price replaced its continuous version in the model with 
categories following the cut-points identified earlier. No clear pattern remains in the residual 
distribution, suggesting most non-linearity has been accounted for by the categorical 
measure of relative document price. A similar procedure was followed in the case of every 
continuous variable; if necessary completing multiple iterations of searching for thresholds. 
In order to preserve the full population of observations, we always included a missing 
category in every categorical variable. In addition, this also helped measuring corruption 
inputs as concealing relevant tender information from bidders or the wider public often 
serves as a corruption technique. 
Figure 1.  
Mean regression residuals by two-percentiles of relative price of 
documentation, left panel: linear prediction; right panel: prediction after 
taking into account non-linearity 
 
Source: PP 
   
When deciding on whether a variable is significant in the model, we used significance 
values from Monte Carlo random permutation simulations (Good, 2006), even though 
standard Fisher significance tests would have led to the same conclusions in most cases. This 
is because standard Fisherian significance tests are appropriate for statistical inference from 
a random sample to a population. However, our public procurement database contains the 
full population of interest, that is there is no sample. While some observations have been 
removed purposefully from the public domain hence from the database (a corruption risk on 
its own which is certainly far from random) this cannot be reflected by Fisher significance 
tests. Permutation tests are widely used in the natural as well as the social sciences, for 
example in social network analysis where data typically relates to full populations and 
observations are not independent of each other (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013). The 
Monte Carlo random permutation simulation randomly reassigns the outcome variable to 
observations multiple times and calculates the regression coefficients each time. By doing so, 
it obtains a distribution of each regression coefficient when the outcome is truly random. The 
probability of the actual test statistic falling outside this random distribution, therefore, 
represents the probability of observing the relationship when the effect is truly random. A 
low significance level indicates that it is highly unlikely that the observed regression 
coefficient could be the result of a random process – a very intuitive interpretation. 
Five different regressions are reported in Table 9, two binary logistic regressions on 
single received bid and two binary logistic regressions on single valid bid, following the same 
structure:  
  (5) 
 iimmillikkijji CDASZ   43210  (6) 
where single bidderi equals 1 if the ith contract awarded had only one bidder and 0 if it has 
more; Zi represents the logit of a contract being a single bidder contract; β0 is the constant of 
the regression; Sij is the matrix of j corruption inputs of the submission phase for the ith 
contract such as length of submission period; Aik stands for the matrix of k corruption inputs 
of the assessment phase for the ith contract such weight of non-price evaluation criteria; Dil 
stands for the matrix of l corruption inputs of the delivery phase for the ith contract such 
contract lengthening; Cim stands for the matrix of m control variables for the ith contract 
such as the number of competitors on the market; εi is the error term; and β1j, β2k , β3l, and 
β4m represent the vectors of coefficients for explanatory and control variables. 
In addition to the four logistic regression models in Table 9, a linear regression on 
winner’s share within issuer’s contracts is reported following the structure: 
 iimmillikkijji CDASY   43210  (7) 
   
where Yi represents winner’s share within issuer’s contracts; β0 is the constant of the 
regression; Sij is the matrix of j corruption inputs of the submission phase for the ith contract 
such as length of submission period; Aik stands for the matrix of k corruption inputs of the 
assessment phase for the ith contract such weight of non-price evaluation criteria; Dil stands 
for the matrix of l corruption inputs of the delivery phase for the ith contract such contract 
lengthening; Cim stands for the matrix of m control variables for the ith contract such as the 
number of competitors on the market; εi is the error term; and β1j, β2k , β3l, and β4m represent 
the vectors of coefficients for explanatory and control variables. 
The main differences among regressions are the outcome variables and whether the 
sample also includes withdrawn contracts (models 2 and 4). Withdrawn contracts couldn’t 
be included in regressions on winner’s share within issuer’s contracts as they would have 
inflated contract values of 12 month periods. Each regression includes the full list of controls 
and predictors having non-missing values in the given sample. Control variables account for 
the most obvious alternative explanations to our corrupt outcomes: 
 type of product procured using 40 different CPV8 divisions which control for 
differences in technology and market standards;  
 number of winners throughout 2009-2012 on the product market using a matrix of 
820 CPV categories at level 3 and 4 geographical regions using NUTS9 definitions 
which makes sure that our findings on single bidders and winner’s share within 
issuer’s contracts are not driven by the low number of competitors available on the 
market. 
 year of contracting which by and large proxies the changes in the legal framework and 
government in power;  
 log real contract value (2009 constant prices) and contract length, both controlling 
for the differences emanating from contract size and complexity;  
 whether the contract is a framework contract which have specific regulations and 
procedural rules10; and  
 issuer type, sector, and status controlling for the regulatory as well as the institutional 
specificities of different issuers. 
The regressions are performed on a restricted sample in order for the regressions to 
adequately fit a corrupt rent extraction logic as opposed to market specificities or 
inexperience with public procurement: 
 markets with at least 3 unique winners throughout 2009-2012 for markets defined by 
a matrix of 820 CPV categories at level 3 and 4 geographical regions using NUTS 
definitions; and 
                                                        
8 CPV=Common Procurement Vocabulary. For more info see: http://simap.europa.eu/codes-and-
nomenclatures/codes-cpv/codes-cpv_en.htm 
9 NUTS=Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics. For more info see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction  
10 For details see:? http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/explan-
notes/classic-dir-framework_en.pdf  
   
 issuers awarding at least 3 contracts in the 12 months period prior to the contract 
award in question. 
By and large, our hypotheses are supported by regressions, warranting the construction 
of a composite indicator reflecting systematically corrupt public procurement (Table 9).11 
First, the single received or valid bid is a powerful predictor of winner’s share within issuer’s 
contracts. Those contracts with a single bid tend to be awarded to winners with 1.8% higher 
share within issuer’s contracts on average compared to contracts with more than one bids. 
This significant effect confirms that restricting the number of bids to one can support 
corrupt rent extraction on a recurrent basis. The magnitude of the impact is modest which is 
not surprising as restricting competition at the submission phase is only one of many ways to 
bent competition in public procurement. 
Second, not publishing the call for tenders in the official journal increases the 
probability of single received and valid bids and the winner’s contract share in every 
regression in line with expectations. For example, in model 1 and 3, it increases the average 
probability of a single received bid contract award by 14.8%-16.9% which is one of the 
strongest impact across models. 
Third, every non-open procedure type carries a higher corruption risk than open 
procedures in terms of single received and valid bids and winner’s contract share, supporting 
and further refining our theoretical expectations. Other, exceptional procedures carry the 
highest corruption risks adding 2.9% to winner’s share within issuer’s contracts compared to 
open procedures. Invitation and negotiation procedures are powerful and significant 
predictors in the regressions explaining single bidder contracts, but they have weak or 
counterintuitive impacts in the winner’s contract share regressions which suggests that their 
main effect is likely to come through number of bidders. Invitation procedures appear to 
have about twice as strong effect on the probability of a single bidder contract award (7.1%-
7.8%) as negotiation procedures (2.7%-5.9%). 
Fourth, relative length of eligibility criteria behaves as expected with more lengthy, thus 
complex, criteria associated with higher probability of a single bidder contract and higher 
winner contract share. The effect of criteria length around the market average length seems 
weak, but positive indicating that there may be markets where complex criteria is frequently 
used to deter bidders. Criteria lengths considerably higher than market average are 
especially strongly associated with higher probability of single bidder contracts and higher 
winner contract share. For example, criteria length above market average by 520-2639 
                                                        
11 Of course, a number of further corruption inputs identified in Fazekas, Tóth, et al. (2013) are not 
presented here as they turned out to be either insignificant or too small. 
   
characters12 increases probability of a single received bid by 10.4%-11.9% and the winner’s 
share within issuer’s contracts by 1.3% compared to the shortest criteria-length group. 
Interestingly, the call for tenders which are published, but don’t contain eligibility criteria at 
the section where it is prescribed by law, are associated with especially high corruption risks: 
9%-16% higher probability of single received bid contract compared to the shortest character 
length group. This signals that making eligibility criteria less visible deters bidders. 
Fifth, the shorter the submission period the higher the probability of single received and 
valid bids and winner contract share in line with expectations. This relationship appears in 
distinct jumps around legally prescribed thresholds and the abuse of weekends. The 
exceptionally short submission period abusing weekends is one of the most powerful 
predictors in all of the models. It increases the winner’s share within issuer’s contracts by 
7.6% and the probability of single valid bid by 17.2%-19.8%. Similar to criteria length, not 
displaying visibly and clearly the submission deadline is associated with very high corruption 
risks, for example 16%-24% higher probability of single received bid. As the effect is 
negligible on winner contract share, this corruption technique’s impact arises primarily in 
the submission phase. 
Sixth, more expensive tender documents increase both the probability of single bidder 
contracts and winner contract share in line with expectations. Compared to free 
documentation, document prices between 0.04%-0.1% of the contract value increase the 
probability of single received bid by 2.9%-3.4% and increase winner’s share within issuer’s 
contracts by 3.5%. Even more expensive tender documents have a stronger impact in the 
single bidder regressions, but insignificant and small effect in the winner contract share 
regression. This indicates that their main effect is exercised in the submission phase. The 
effect of the cheapest tender documentation is ambiguous across regressions. Missing tender 
documentation price is insignificant in most regressions. Therefore, these categories receive 
a zero weight in the composite indicator. 
Seventh, call for tenders modifications behave according to expectations only for the 
period of the previous government (before 01/05/2010)13, that is it increases the probability 
of single bidder contracts and the winner’s market share. While it takes on a considerable 
significant negative coefficient under the current government’ period. These differences 
signal the changing role call for tenders modifications may play in corrupt rent extraction in 
response to changing regulatory (e.g. new Public Procurement Law entering into force soon 
after the new government entered into force) and political climate such judicial review of 
                                                        
12 Standard deviation of character lengths from the population mean is 3435 for the whole 2009-
2012 period. So, eligibility criteria 2639 characters above its market average is about three quarters 
standard deviation difference. 
13 Restricted sample results are not reported here. Regression outputs can be obtained from the 
authors. 
   
modifications (interviews indicate that the regulations and practice of judicial review of 
procurement tenders changed considerably after the new government entered office). Call 
for tenders modifications receive a positive weight in the composite indicator only for the 
pre-May 2012 period reflecting a conservative approach. 
Table 9.  
Regression results on contract level, 2009-2012, average marginal effects 
reported for models 1-4 and unstandardized coefficients  
for model 5, nr. of winners >=3 
models 1 2 3 4 5 
Independent vars / dependent vars 
single 
received bid 
single 
received bid 
single valid 
bid 
single valid 
bid 
winner's 12 month 
market share 
single received/valid bid 
    
0.018*** 
P(Fisher) 
    
0.000 
P(permute) 
    
0.000 
no call for tenders published in official journal 0.169*** 0.14*** 0.148*** 0.121*** 0.039*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.040 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
procedure type 
     
ref. cat.=open procedure 
     
1=invitation procedure 0.078*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.06*** -0.032* 
P(Fisher) 0.126 0.122 0.301 0.308 0.259 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 
2=negotiation procedure 0.027*** 0.03*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.009* 
P(Fisher) 0.064 0.036 0.002 0.001 0.379 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 
3=other procedures 0.275*** 0.274*** 0.257*** 0.258*** 0.029*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 0.021** 0.028*** 0.011 0.017 -0.008 
P(Fisher) 0.134 0.049 0.484 0.270 0.256 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.140 0.055 0.155 
length of eligibility criteria 
     
ref.cat.=length<-2922.125 
     
1= -2922.125<length<=520.7038 0.062*** 0.046*** 0.028* 0.019 0.001 
P(Fisher) 0.009 0.044 0.328 0.505 0.942 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.065 0.895 
2= 520.7038<length<=2639.729 0.119*** 0.104*** 0.07*** 0.063*** 0.013 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.041 0.427 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 
3= 2639.729<length 0.138*** 0.124*** 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.014 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.035 0.418 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.105 
4= missing length 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.018*** 0.048*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.007 0.247 0.621 0.045 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
short submission period 
     
ref.cat.=normal submission period 
     
1=accelerated submission period 0.02*** 0.022*** 0.005 0.007 0.014*** 
P(Fisher) 0.067 0.051 0.715 0.581 0.028 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.525 0.335 0.000 
2=exceptional submission period 0.086*** 0.09*** 0.076*** 0.084*** 0.047*** 
P(Fisher) 0.005 0.002 0.025 0.009 0.163 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3=except. submission per. abusing weekend 0.189*** 0.216*** 0.172*** 0.198*** 0.076*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.087 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4=missing submission period 0.24*** 0.16*** 0.082*** 0.028 -0.009 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.088 0.490 0.743 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.545 
relative price of tender documentation 
     
ref.cat.= relative price=0 
     
1= 0<relative price<=0.0004014 -0.003 -0.01 -0.02 -0.042*** 0.062*** 
P(Fisher) 0.902 0.598 0.371 0.060 0.001 
P(permute) 0.860 0.360 0.130 0.000 0.000 
   
2= 0.0004014<relative price<=0.0009966 0.034*** 0.029** 0.016 -0.005 0.035*** 
P(Fisher) 0.095 0.128 0.419 0.796 0.013 
P(permute) 0.000 0.005 0.225 0.715 0.000 
3= 0.0009966<relative price<=0.0021097 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.027* 0.008 0.009 
P(Fisher) 0.079 0.097 0.155 0.677 0.412 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.495 0.230 
4= 0.0021097<relative price 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.03** 0.012 0.000 
P(Fisher) 0.005 0.012 0.092 0.487 0.989 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.235 0.985 
models 1 2 3 4 5 
5=missing relative price -0.011 -0.001 -0.004 -0.017 -0.008* 
P(Fisher) 0.651 0.971 0.834 0.389 0.451 
P(permute) 0.195 0.940 0.605 0.065 0.190 
call for tenders modified -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 0.017*** 
P(Fisher) 0.059 0.029 0.039 0.033 0.032 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
weight of non-price evaluation criteria 
     
ref.cat.= only price 
     
2= 0<non-price criteria weight<=0.4 -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.043*** -0.034*** -0.002 
P(Fisher) 0.053 0.121 0.004 0.019 0.782 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.705 
3= 0.4<non-price criteria weight<=0.556 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.028*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.006 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4= 0.556<non-price criteria weight<1 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.038*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5=only non-price criteria -0.001 0.001 -0.012 -0.012 0.007*** 
P(Fisher) 0.947 0.938 0.464 0.465 0.265 
P(permute) 0.925 0.885 0.175 0.190 0.220 
procedure annulled and re-launched  -0.112*** 
 
-0.031* 
 
P(Fisher) 
 
0.000 
 
0.357 
 
P(permute) 
 
0.000 
 
0.010 
 
length of decision period 
     
ref.cat.= 44<decision period<=182 
     
1= decision period<=32 0.085*** 0.078*** 0.121*** 0.117*** 0.013** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 
2= 32<decision period<=44 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.016*** 
P(Fisher) 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.028 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4= 182<decision period 0.142*** 0.147*** 0.155*** 0.161*** 0.046*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5= missing decision period -0.043*** -0.02 -0.036*** -0.016 0.022* 
P(Fisher) 0.076 0.324 0.251 0.549 0.120 
P(permute) 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.095 0.025 
contract modified during delivery -0.004 -0.004 -0.026*** -0.024*** 0.015*** 
P(Fisher) 0.718 0.726 0.028 0.032 0.016 
P(permute) 0.465 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.000 
contract extension(length/value) 
     
ref.cat.=c.length diff.<=0 AND c.value diff.<=0.001 
     
2=0<c.length d.<=0.16 OR 0.001<c.value d.<=0.24 -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.02 -0.026 -0.01 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.001 0.359 0.204 0.405 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.175 0.060 0.355 
3= 0.16<c. length diff. OR 0.24<c.value diff. -0.008 -0.017 0.007  0.000 -0.006 
P(Fisher) 0.701 0.373 0.753 0.986 0.550 
P(permute) 0.580 0.125 0.675 0.985 0.450 
4= missing (with contr. completion ann.) -0.023** -0.022** -0.017* -0.017* -0.002 
P(Fisher) 0.176 0.176 0.315 0.289 0.782 
P(permute) 0.005 0.005 0.045 0.015 0.715 
5= missing (NO contr. completion ann.) -0.01 -0.011* 0.003 0.005 0.003 
P(Fisher) 0.394 0.296 0.773 0.623 0.709 
P(permute) 0.120 0.050 0.610 0.340 0.565 
constant included in each regression; control variables: product market (cpv divisions); number of winners on the market (market defined by 
cpv level 4 & nuts 1) year of contract award; log real contract value; contract length; framework contract; issuer type, sector, and status (public 
or private) 
N 48853 52390 39309 42607 20653 
R2/pseudo-R2 0.1038 0.0998 0.1022 0.0986 0.2433 
Source: PP; Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; clustered standard errors clustered by issuer for P(Fisher), Monte Carlo 
random permutation simulations for P(permute) (200 permutations) using stata 12.0 
   
Eight, the effect of the weight of non-price evaluation criteria turned out to be 
somewhat different from expectations. Instead of a clearly positive relationship, we found an 
inverted U-shape relationship (Figure 2). This can be interpreted using our interview 
evidence: stipulating only or predominantly price-related evaluation criteria warrants fair 
competition, hence, it is associated with lower corruption risks. While majority subjective 
criteria suggests rigged competition deterring bidders and increasing winner contract share. 
Only non-price evaluation criteria combined with fixed price is most likely complying with 
certain industry standards such as IT procurement without signalling heightened corruption 
risks (Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2013b). Hence, only the two categories with positive coefficient 
receive non-zero weight in the composite indicator. 
Figure 2.  
Effect sizes of weight of non-price evaluation criteria from model 1 
 
Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Ninth, annulling and re-launching procedures has the expected sign for both single 
received and single valid bid outcomes, but its effect cannot be determined on winner 
contract share due to technical complexities. Annulling a contract award is associated with 
3.1%-11.2% lower probability of single bidder contract award, that is contract awards are 
annulled and re-launched more often when there were multiple bidders. This is completely 
contradictory to the prescriptions of the EU Public Procurement Directive or the Hungarian 
Public Procurement Law, but in line with a corrupt rent extraction logic. 
Tenth, the effects of decision period length on probability of single bid and winner 
contract share are both somewhat different from our expectations. It seems that the 
relationship follows a U-shaped pattern with average decision period lengths (between 40th 
and 90th percentile) having the lowest corruption risk (Figure 3). Compared to this reference 
   
category, exceptionally long decision periods and exceptionally short decision periods are 
both associated with high corruption risks. Decision periods longer than 182 working days 
result in 14.2%-16.1% higher probability of single bid contract and 4.6% higher winner’s 
share within issuer’s contracts. Decision periods shorter than 32 working days are associated 
with 7.8%-12.1% higher probability of single bid contract and 1.3% higher winner contract 
share. Decision periods between 32 and 44 working days have a somewhat weaker effect 
than exceptionally short decision periods. These results suggest that there are two 
mechanisms at play. First, exceptionally short decision periods may indicate rushed through 
decisions and the corresponding high corruption risks. Second, exceptionally long decision 
periods may signal multiple legal challenges and troubled decision making hence high 
corruption risks. While the missing category is significant in some models, its effect is far 
from clear, thus, it cannot be included in the composite indicator. 
Figure 3.  
Effect sizes of decision period length from model 1 
 
Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Eleventh, contract modification has the expected relationships with probability of single 
bid and winner contract share albeit effect sizes are small in general and insignificant for 
model 1-2. Modifying contract at least once after contract award is associated with 2.4%-
2.6% lower probability of single valid bid and 1.5% higher winner’s share within issuer’s 
contracts. This indicates that a competitive contract award procedure may necessitate 
contract modification to assure rent extraction. 
Twelfth, increasing contract length and increasing the contract value after contract 
award had to be considered together due to low number of relevant observations. These two 
techniques can be combined in as much as they represent two parallel methods for 
increasing the profitability of a contract, that is making delivery cheaper by extending the 
   
completion deadline or making price higher by increasing contract value. Contract extension 
(length/value) display the expected relationships, but effects are insignificant for the winner 
contract share regression.  
Compared to contracts which were performed within the timeframe of delivery and 
original contract price (less than 0.1% value increase), contracts with 0%-16.2% longer 
delivery period or 0.1%-24% higher contract value were associated with 6.1%-6.4% lower 
probability of single received bid. For contracts which were extended even more the effects 
are insignificant which may signal that excessive project overruns are more often due to non-
corrupt reasons such as low state capacity. For contracts whose contract completion 
announcement didn’t contain the prescribed final contract length or final contract value 
information the probability of single bid was 1.7%-2.3% lower which is a moderately strong 
impact. This suggests that competitive tendering makes it more necessary to hide the final 
total performance potentially not according to original contractual terms. Hence, contract 
extensions of moderate magnitude and missing information are included in the composite 
indicator. 
Based on these regression results the variables and their categories could be selected 
which will make up the composite corruption risk index (CRI). First, all three corruption 
outcomes could be part of CRI because the regressions accounting for them are of adequate 
quality (i.e. formal tests of model appropriateness are affirmative). Second, as mentioned 
earlier, outcome variables get the weight of 1 reflecting their benchmark status. Qualitative 
evidence clearly underlines that any of the corruption inputs (i.e. corruption techniques) is 
sufficient on its own to render a procurement procedure corrupt. Therefore, each significant 
corruption input receives the weight of 1. In order to reflect coefficient sizes of categories in 
each corruption input, we ranked categories of each variable with the most impactful 
category receiving weight 1 and the others proportionately lower weights. For example, if 
there are four significant categories of a variable, then they would get weights 1, 0.75, 0.5, 
and 0.25. Finally, we normed each component weight so that the resulting composite 
indicator falls between 0 and 1 (Table 10). This was achieved in two steps: component 
weights were divided by the total number of components (N=13), then the resulting score 
was divided by its observed maximum (CRI[raw]=0.805). This rescaling assures that the 
minimum (maximum) of the score corresponds to the lowest (highest) corruption risks 
observed. The upper end of the scale may be too conservative as the combined presence of 3-
4 corruption inputs and/or outputs (CRI=0.27-0.36) is already almost certainly very corrupt 
according to our interviewees14. 
                                                        
14 Calculating CRI for court decisions which established corruption in public procurement could 
serve as a more robust upper bound for the CRI scale. Further work is in progress. 
   
Table 10.  
Component weights of CRI reflecting variable and category impact on 
corruption outcomes, normed to have an overall sum of 1 
variable component weight 
single received/valid bid 0.096 
no call for tenders published in official journal 0.096 
procedure type 
 
ref. cat.=open procedure 0.000 
1=invitation procedure 0.048 
2=negotiation procedure 0.072 
3=other procedures 0.096 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 0.024 
length of eligibility criteria 
 
ref.cat.=length<-2922.125 0.000 
1= -2922.125<length<=520.7038 0.024 
2= 520.7038<length<=2639.729 0.048 
3= 2639.729<length 0.072 
4= missing length 0.096 
short submission period 
 
ref.cat.=normal submission period 0.000 
1=accelerated submission period 0.048 
2=exceptional submission period 0.072 
3=except. submission per. abusing weekend 0.096 
4=missing submission period 0.024 
relative price of tender documentation 0.000 
ref.cat.= relative price=0 0.000 
1= 0<relative price<=0.0004014 0.000 
2= 0.0004014<relative price<=0.0009966 0.096 
3= 0.0009966<relative price<=0.0021097 0.064 
4= 0.0021097<relative price 0.032 
5=missing relative price 0.000 
call for tenders modification(only before 01/05/2010) 
 
weight of non-price evaluation criteria 0.000 
ref.cat.= only price 0.000 
2= 0<non-price criteria weight<=0.4 0.000 
3= 0.4<non-price criteria weight<=0.556 0.048 
4= 0.556<non-price criteria weight<1 0.096 
5=only non-price criteria 0.000 
procedure annulled and re-launched subsequently 0.096 
length of decision period 
 
ref.cat.= 44<decision period<=182 0.000 
1= decision period<=32 0.064 
2= 32<decision period<=44 0.032 
4= 182<decision period 0.096 
5= missing decision period 0.000 
contract modified during delivery 0.096 
contract extension(length/value) 
 
ref.cat.= c.length diff.<=0 AND c.value diff.<=0.001 0.000 
2= 0<c. length d.<=0.162 OR 0.001<c.value d.<=0.24 0.096 
3= 0.162<c. length diff. OR 0.24<c.value diff. 0.000 
4= missing (with contr. completion ann.) 0.048 
5= missing (NO contr. completion ann.) 0.000 
winner's market share 0.096 
Source: PP 
Note: If the call for tenders or contract fulfilment announcements are missing, the index is reweighted to only 
reflect the available variables (i.e. proportionately increasing the weight of observed variables). 
   
 
6.2 VALIDATING THE CORRUPTION RISK INDEX 
Validating CRI will take several years of work, here only elementary validating procedures 
are done. First, we look at the cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI to see if it 
behaves in any apparently unusual way. Second, the relationship between the amount of 
spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level is explored to 
gauge the possible extent of distortion due to missing observations. Third, profitability and 
turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI are analysed. Fourth, political control of 
winning companies is collated with their CRI. Fifth, average CRI of companies whose market 
success seems to be strongly determined by the government in power is compared with those 
whose success is largely unaffected by government change (Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2013a). 
First, applying the weights specified in Table 10, each contract receives a corruption risk 
index (CRI) falling into a 0–1 band. Calculating the average CRI of each winning firm results 
in a CRI distribution which doesn’t deviate extensively from a normal distribution, albeit it 
has a long tail to the right (Figure 4). These companies with CRI higher than approximately 
0.4-0.5 represent particularly high corruption risks and hence deserve attention in later 
research. 
Figure 4.  
Frequency distribution of winners according to CRI, 2009-201215, N=4430 
 
Source: PP 
                                                        
15 In order to calculate CRI for 2009 where the 12-month values of winner’s share within issuer’s 
contracts is not available we had to input this variable using model 5 in Table 9. 
   
 
 
A simple test of indicator reliability is whether it displays any unexpected jumps at 
particular points in time or whether it reflects drastic changes known to impact on 
corruption. As CRI is defined for individual contract awards, monthly time series can be 
developed by calculating the CRI of the average contract. Such aggregation leads to a CRI 
time-series which is stable over time while showing some interesting variation from month 
to month (Figure 5). For example, it displays a spike just after the new government came into 
power which is primarily driven by contract modifications and longer decision periods. 
These are expected when dominant corrupt networks succeed each other and the newcomer 
tries to gain control of as many active sources of rent extraction as possible. 
Figure 5.  
Monthly average CRI, 1/1/2009 – 31/12/2012 (averaging using the number and 
value of contracts awarded in each month), N=43642 
 
Source: PP 
 
CRI declined between January 2009 and September 2010, but has increased since then 
which may provide hints at the performance of the new Fidesz government (Figure 5); 
although public procurement follows distinct cycles around elections hence comparisons are 
more appropriate at the same points in each cycle. Most interestingly, the Fidesz government 
has introduced a range of changes to the public procurement law which decreased 
transparency in at least three ways: 1) introducing less stringent requirements to publish call 
for tenders; 2) removing the requirement to publish contract fulfilment announcements; and 
3) making it easier to move contracts outside the public procurement law for example by 
   
invoking national security concerns. Each of these can be tracked with our data creating an 
alternative estimate for CRI.  
The baseline CRI is simply reweighted if call for tenders or contract fulfilment 
announcements are not available by relying on the available variables more extensively. 
However, as limiting transparency is a corruption technique confirmed by qualitative as well 
as quantitative evidence, it is reasonable to assume that the non-observed announcements 
are as risky as the highest corruption risk announcements observed. Under such a scenario, 
the starkly increasing corruption risks become visible after the Fidesz government takes 
power (Figure 5).  
It is also possible to track the ratio of public procurement spending announced in the 
Public Procurement Bulletin to total public procurement spending (Figure 6). Since, the 
Fidesz government took power in 2010, this ratio has been cut by a half to reach only 22%. 
Once again, knowing that contracts awarded outside the remit of the Public Procurement 
Law represent higher corruption risks (for a detailed discussion see Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 
2013b), it seems that corruption risks have increased between May 2010 and December 
2012.  
Figure 6.  
Public procurement spending announced in the Public Procurement Bulletin 
and total public procurement spending, 2009-2011 
 
Source: PP 
Notes: for details of calculating total procurement spending from Treasury annual budget accounts see: 
(Audet, 2002; European Commission, 2011b). The ratio reported is only an estimation as spending as 
announced in PP refers to the total lifetime of the contract while Treasury accounts contain only the spending 
accrued in a given year. Further reason for imprecision of the ratio is that the set of institutions submitting 
accounts to the Treasury and those subject to the Public Procurement Law are somewhat different. 
 
 
   
Second, as qualitative evidence points out that removing contracts and procedures from 
the remit of the Public Procurement Law and hence the public domain is a corruption 
technique on its own, it is possible that the PP database is a biased sample of all the contracts 
and procedures relevant for analysing institutionalised grand corruption. It is possible to 
calculate the total estimated public procurement spending for each public organisation using 
Treasury data on individual organisations’ annual budget breakdowns. By exploring the 
relationship between the amount of missing spending and average CRI per organisation, we 
get an insight into the potential bias due to missing data. The natural logarithm of the ratio 
of total procurement spending (Treasury records) to reported public procurement spending 
(Public Procurement Bulletin) is weakly negatively correlated with average organisational 
CRI (r2=-0.12) (Figure 6Figure 7). This implies that the missing data bias is in line with our 
overall conservative approach of developing a lower bound estimate of institutionalised 
grand corruption, at least on the level of organisations. In addition, the overall weak 
relationship indicates that this bias is mostly due to random factors rather than systematic 
avoidance of transparency. 
Figure 7. 
 Issuer annual mean CRI and log total procurement to procurement reported in 
the Public Procurement Bulletin, 2009-2012, N=1717 
 
Source: PP 
 
 
   
Third, we expect high CRI companies to earn higher profit and increase their turnover 
quicker than their low CRI peers because the primary aim of institutionalised grand 
corruption, which we are measuring with CRI, is to generate extra profit considerably above 
market average. However, we believe this relationship is likely to be only of moderate 
magnitude and probabilistic as high corruption companies are often hiding their profits and 
turnover through offshore companies, chains of subcontractors, and tax fraud. These have 
been confirmed by interviews in Hungary. 
Simple comparisons of companies falling in the quintiles of CRI reveal a relationship in 
line with expectations (Figure 8). Percentile comparisons are preferable to simple 
correlations as corruption may have a non-linear effect on profitability and turnover growth 
(linear correlation coefficients are 0.04 and 0.02). Companies of highest CRI 
(0.35<CRI<0.87) are more profitable than any other company group, but the difference is 
especially large when compared to the lowest CRI companies (0<CRI<0.16): 1.3% points 
higher profit margin or 30% more profitable (1.3/4.4). Turnover growth, that is turnover in t1 
divided by turnover in t0, is characterised by the same relationship with CRI. The highest 
CRI group has a 24% higher growth rate than the lowest CRI group. To some up, public 
procurement suppliers designated as high corruption risk companies by our corruption risk 
index are both more profitable and increase their turnover quicker than companies of the 
lowest corruption risk group. The fact that the relationship is particularly pronounced when 
comparing the two ends of the CRI distribution suggests that extremities of the CRI 
distribution may be the most precise in signalling institutionalised grand corruption. 
Figure 8.  
Mean profit margin and mean turnover growth by CRI quintiles, 2009-2012, N 
(pr.margin)=3097; N(turno.growth)=2894 
 
Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 designate the significance of the difference from the “low CRI” group. 
Significance levels computed using Monte-Carlo random permutations (300 repetitions) with stata 
   
 
Fourth, we expect that companies with political connections to display higher corruption 
risks as the primary vehicle for maintaining institutionalised grand corruption is to have 
strong ties between powerful political and business actors. We mapped the owners and 
manager of each company winning in 2009-2012 (15% of companies were either 
unidentifiable or we lacked the relevant data) and matched them with key political 
officeholders of public organisations existing in the period (for full list of institutions and 
offices see Annex C). The matching was done between more than 35000 owners/managers of 
winning firms and more than 10000 political officeholders based on full name16. Matching 
solely on name is obviously prone to random error which is nevertheless set aside for the 
present analysis by assuming that name frequency is not correlated with CRI. Those 
companies which have or had at least one owner or manager holding a political office at any 
point in time were designated as politically connected firms. 
In line with our expectations, politically connected firms are of higher CRI (Table 11), 
they have a higher CRI by 0.01 on average than companies without political connections. 
While this difference is relatively small, increasing the precision of identifying political 
connections will shed more light at the validity of CRI. The magnitude of group differences 
may also signal that political connections serve as a means to corruption only in some cases 
while in others the politicians just picking profitable companies winning procurement 
contracts. 
Table 11.  
Comparisons of mean CRI of politically connected and not connected firms, 
2009-2012 
Group N 
Mean 
CRI 
Std. 
Err. 
Std. Dev. 
95% 
Conf.Interval 
0=no political connection 2687 0.254 0.002 0.113 0.250 0.258 
1=politically connected 1318 0.264 0.003 0.112 0.258 0.270 
combined 4005 0.257 0.002 0.113 0.254 0.261 
difference (CRI1-CRI0) 
 
0.010*** 0.004 
 
0.017 0.003 
Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; Significance levels computed using Monte-Carlo random 
permutations (300 repetitions) with stata 
 
Fifth, it is possible to predict the total contract volumes of companies winning public 
procurement contracts between 2009-2012, and hence to identify those companies which 
win considerably more or less when the government changed in 2010 controlling for 
company characteristics such as prior investment and main market (Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 
                                                        
16 Matching based on publicly available biographical data will be available in a later version of this 
paper. 
   
2013a). While more work is needed to reliably carry out this analysis, we expect that those 
companies whose market success highly depends on who is in power, i.e. latent political 
connections, display higher CRI. This is because institutionalised grand corruption is likely 
to be strongest where political connections are present. A simple comparison of the two 
groups’ CRIs reveal a relationship in line with our expectations ( 
Table 12). Companies with government dependent contract volume have 0.01 or 5% 
higher CRI than those whose contract volume is unaffected by which government is in 
power. While this difference is relatively small, it supports the claim that latent political 
connections translate into institutionalised grand corruption as measured by CRI. 
Table 12.  
Comparisons of mean CRI17 of companies whose market success does or does 
not depend on the which government is in power, 2009-2012 
Group N 
Mean 
CRI 
Std. 
Err. 
Std. Dev. 
95% 
Conf.Interval 
0=success not linked to 
government change 
428 0.205 0.006 0.120 0.193 0.216 
1=success linked to 
government change 
2481 0.214 0.002 0.111 0.210 0.219 
combined 2909 0.213 0.002 0.112 0.209 0.217 
difference (CRI1-CRI0) 
 
0.010*** 0.006 
 
0.021 -0.002 
Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.005; *** p<0.001, Significance levels computed using Monte-Carlo random 
permutations (300 repetitions) with stata 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND THE USES OF THE INDICATORS 
The analysis demonstrated that it is feasible and fruitful to construct a corruption risk index 
(CRI) at the micro-level based on objective behavioural data only. Initial evidence confirms 
the validity of CRI. The great advantage of our approach is that a large amount of data is 
available for research across every developed country for the last 6-8 years, opening up a new 
horizon for comparative corruption research. In addition, such comparative research will be 
able to use a conceptually much clearer concept whose measurement avoids the pitfalls of 
subjective indicators as well as prior objective indicators. 
 
                                                        
17 Unlike in other validation tests, this test makes use of CRI aggregated by contract value rather 
than number of contracts. Hence, its meaning is closer to ‘corruption risk index of the average HUF 
won’ rather than average corruption risk index of the average contract won’. The reason for using 
contract value-based aggregation is that identification of companies as government-dependent is 
done using their contract volumes hence contract value aggregated CRI is more consistent with the 
company identification strategy. Findings are qualitatively the same with the alternative aggregation 
method. 
   
Almost every corruption input displayed a relationship with corruption outcomes in line 
with prior expectations (Table 13). Robust models linking corruption inputs to outputs 
allowed for deriving component weights for CRI composed of 14 variable groups neither of 
which dominates the resulting index (linear correlation coefficients between corruption 
inputs and CRI range between 0.01 and 0.57). The strength of this approach is that any 
change of regulation impacting on the relative costs of a corruption technique compared to 
other techniques leaves our CRI robust, as the increasing use of measured substitutive 
corruption techniques are adequately reflected. This characteristic of our CRI is particularly 
useful when comparing different countries of diverse regulatory environments and power 
constellations between elite groups. Further comparative work will use the same set of 
variables and regression setup in order to identify country- and period-specific parameters, 
as for example character-length of eligibility criteria tailored to a single company is likely to 
vary across countries and time with different regulatory institutions while the underlying 
institutionalised corruption may remain the same (Fazekas, Chvalkovská, et al., 2013). 
Table 13.  
Summary of regression results 
Phase INPUT/OUTPUT 
single received/ 
valid bid 
winner market 
share 
empirical direction of relationship 
submission 
Single bidder contract not relevant + 
Call for tenders not published in official 
journal 
+ + 
Procedure type + + 
Length of eligibility criteria + + 
Exceptionally short submission period + + 
Relative price of documentation + + 
Call for tenders modification(only before 
01/05/2010) 
+ + 
assessment 
Exclusion of all but one bid not relevant + 
Weight of non-price evaluation criteria ∩  ∩  
Annulled procedure re-launched 
subsequently* 
- not tested 
Length of decision period U U 
delivery 
Contract modification - + 
Contract extension (length/value) - 0 
Source: PP 
 
We expect subsequent research to further validate CRI collating it to additional measures 
of grand corruption in more detail in Hungary and replicate measurement and analysis in 
other countries (work is ongoing for Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Russia).
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Annex A - Availability of public procurement data 
Table 14.  
Overview of contract-level public procurement data availability in selected countries and regions, 2000-2012 
Country Data-source Key online source 
Minimum threshold 
(2012, classical issuer, 
services, EUR)18 
Period Availability 
Czech 
Republic 
Ministerstvo pro místní rozvoj ČR http://www.isvzus.cz/usisvz/  39,000 2006-2012 
structured data readily available 
and partially cleaned 
EU Tenders Electronic Daily http://ted.europa.eu/ 130,000 2005-2012 
structured data partially 
available and cleaned 
Germany Bund.de- Verwaltung Online 
http://www.bund.de/DE/Auss
chreibungen/ausschreibungen
_node.html  
130,00019 2010-201220 raw data available, not cleaned 
Hungary Közbeszerzési Értesítő http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/  27,300 2005-2012 
structured data available and 
partially cleaned 
Romania eLicitatie http://www.e-licitatie.ro/  30,000 2007-2012 raw data available, not cleaned 
Russia Goszakupki www.zakupki.gov.ru  2,500 2006-201221 
structured data partially 
available and cleaned 
Slovakia Úrad pre verejné obstarávanie http://tender.sme.sk/en/  30,000 2005-2012 
structured data readily available 
and partially cleaned 
UK UK Contracts Finder 
http://www.contractsfinder.bu
sinesslink.gov.uk/  
11,600 2000-2012 raw data available, not cleaned 
US 
Federal Procurement Data System - 
Next Generation 
https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_
cms/  
1,850 2004-2012 
structured data readily available 
and partially cleaned 
 
 
                                                        
18 National currencies are converted into EUR using official exchange rates of 5/2/2013 of the European Central Bank. 
19 It was increased from 30,000 EUR during the economic crisis. 
20 Earlier data have to be requested from the relevant bodies. 
21 2006-2010 only for some regions. 
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Annex B - Robustness checks 
The most convincing alternative explanation to this paper’s interpretation of regressions as 
models of corrupt contract award states that products and services bought by public 
agencies are highly specific. Therefore, both single bidder and high share of the winner 
within the issuer’s contracts are driven by the lack of adequate suppliers rather than 
corruption. In order to control for this important confounding factor each regression 
contains the number of winners on the market throughout 2009-2012 as an explanatory 
factor. In addition, this annex reports regressions on restricted samples which include 
contracts for products and services procured on markets with more than 2, 9, and 37 
winners in 2009-2012. The cut-points 2 and 37 were defined using the same technique of 
identifying thresholds in continuous variables as spelled out in section 6.1. The cut-point of 
9 was added arbitrarily in order to display an intermediary value. 
To define the number of adequate competitors on a market, an appropriate definition of 
market has to be found. We defined markets along two dimensions: 1) the nature of product 
or service procured, and 2) the geographical location of contract performance. CPV codes 
differentiate over 3000 products and services as detailed as eggs (03142500-3) or potatoes 
(03212100-1). While we aim at being conservative in market definition, such level of detail 
is surely excessive. Exploiting the hierarchical nature of CPV classification, level-4 
categories were selected as suitable for market definition, because the distribution of 
winners throughout 2009-2012 suggested that there are a large number of markets with a 
fairly small winners. Contracts were awarded in 820 level-4 CPV categories such as crops, 
products of market gardening and horticulture (0311) or construction materials (4411). 
Even though Hungary is a relatively small country interviewees suggested that there may be 
geographical frontiers of markets. Hence, we used 3 NUTS-1 regions plus the whole country 
to define markets along a geographical dimension (national reach typically requires an 
extensive set of local offices warranting an effective market barrier). Taken together, these 
resulted in 820*4=3280 distinct markets. 
To define how many suitable competitors a market has, we simply calculated the winners of 
each market throughout 2009-2012. This is a conservative estimate as bidders who never 
won, for example because they were too expensive, but submitted valid bids were not taken 
into account. As some companies may have gone bankrupt or been bought by others, this 
estimation strategy may also be somewhat upward biased; therefore in some regressions we 
excluded markets with very many competitors. 
The below tables demonstrate the robustness of our models to excluding markets with 
specific products and services (Error! Reference source not found., Table 15, and 
Table 16). Each of the findings in these alternative specifications remain unchanged 
compared to the main regressions, while indicators of goodness of fit improve somewhat. 
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Table 15.  
Regression results on contract level, 2009-2012, average marginal effects 
reported for models 1-4 and unstandardized coefficients  
for model 5, nr. of winners >=38 
models 1 2 3 4 5 
Independent vars / dependent vars 
single received 
bid 
single received 
bid 
single valid 
bid 
single valid 
bid 
winner's 12 
month market 
share 
single received/valid bid 
    
0.027*** 
P(Fisher) 
    
0.000 
P(permute) 
    
0.000 
no call for tenders published in official journal 0.173*** 0.131*** 0.167*** 0.128*** 0.057*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
procedure type 
     
ref. cat.=open procedure 
     
1=invitation procedure 0.065*** 0.06*** 0.067*** 0.058*** -0.021 
P(Fisher) 0.224 0.206 0.332 0.339 0.471 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.195 
2=negotiation procedure 0.025*** 0.03*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.013 
P(Fisher) 0.14 0.074 0.002 0.002 0.235 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 
3=other procedures 0.305*** 0.3*** 0.282*** 0.281*** 0.031*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 0.03** 0.039*** 0.019 0.026*** -0.008 
P(Fisher) 0.062 0.017 0.315 0.165 0.379 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.275 
length of eligibility criteria 
     
ref.cat.=length<-2922.125 
     
1= -2922.125<length<=520.7038 0.054*** 0.033*** 0.02 0.009 0.014 
P(Fisher) 0.067 0.227 0.556 0.784 0.233 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.420 0.175 
2= 520.7038<length<=2639.729 0.125*** 0.106*** 0.079*** 0.07*** 0.022 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.001 0.031 0.052 0.114 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.070 
3= 2639.729<length 0.135*** 0.116*** 0.079*** 0.068*** 0.025 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.001 0.049 0.087 0.106 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 
4= missing length 0.151*** 0.057*** 0.03 -0.008*** 0.041* 
P(Fisher) 0.001 0.132 0.540 0.841 0.052 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.015 
short submission period 
     
ref.cat.=normal submission period 
     
1=accelerated submission period 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.005 0.009 0.015*** 
P(Fisher) 0.048 0.028 0.719 0.530 0.045 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.515 0.260 0.010 
2=exceptional submission period 0.08*** 0.089*** 0.047*** 0.065*** 0.012 
P(Fisher) 0.028 0.006 0.265 0.090 0.514 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.500 
3=except. submission per. abusing weekend 0.136*** 0.193*** 0.088* 0.153*** 0.039 
P(Fisher) 0.019 0.004 0.131 0.013 0.423 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.520 
4=missing submission period 0.28*** 0.163*** 0.123*** 0.047* -0.014 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.308 0.641 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.495 
relative price of tender documentation 
     
ref.cat.= relative price=0 
     
1= 0<relative price<=0.0004014 -0.003 -0.013 -0.019 -0.047*** 0.056*** 
P(Fisher) 0.901 0.531 0.463 0.053 0.010 
P(permute) 0.855 0.295 0.165 0.000 0.000 
2= 0.0004014<relative price<=0.0009966 0.022 0.016 0.011 -0.019 0.038*** 
P(Fisher) 0.361 0.455 0.673 0.418 0.015 
P(permute) 0.070 0.195 0.440 0.175 0.000 
3= 0.0009966<relative price<=0.0021097 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.022 -0.005 0.012 
P(Fisher) 0.121 0.135 0.346 0.839 0.388 
P(permute) 0.000 0.005 0.120 0.720 0.245 
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4= 0.0021097<relative price 0.07*** 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.015 0.003 
P(Fisher) 0.005 0.009 0.055 0.482 0.803 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.765 
models 1 2 3 4 5 
5=missing relative price -0.005 0.005 0.001 -0.02 -0.012* 
P(Fisher) 0.856 0.828 0.983 0.416 0.304 
P(permute) 0.565 0.620 0.970 0.065 0.180 
call for tenders modified -0.015 -0.02* -0.013 -0.016 0.005 
P(Fisher) 0.441 0.288 0.617 0.538 0.610 
P(permute) 0.090 0.030 0.185 0.105 0.515 
weight of non-price evaluation criteria 
     
ref.cat.= only price 
     
2= 0<non-price criteria weight<=0.4 0.002 0.005 -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.003 
P(Fisher) 0.882 0.718 0.176 0.316 0.722 
P(permute) 0.675 0.405 0.000 0.000 0.585 
3= 0.4<non-price criteria weight<=0.556 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.047*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4= 0.556<non-price criteria weight<1 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.095*** 0.086*** 0.045*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5=only non-price criteria -0.005 -0.002 -0.008 -0.009 0.001 
P(Fisher) 0.711 0.900 0.672 0.615 0.893 
P(permute) 0.530 0.840 0.520 0.360 0.865 
procedure annulled and re-launched 
 
-0.098*** 
 
-0.027* 
 
P(Fisher) 
 
0.001 
 
0.422 
 
P(permute) 
 
0.000 
 
0.035 
 
length of decision period 
     
ref.cat.= 44<decision period<=182 
     
1= decision period<=32 0.075*** 0.067*** 0.123*** 0.119*** 0.014* 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 
2= 32<decision period<=44 0.03*** 0.023*** 0.04*** 0.042*** 0.021*** 
P(Fisher) 0.030 0.067 0.012 0.003 0.019 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4= 182<decision period 0.133*** 0.147*** 0.179*** 0.187*** 0.05*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5= missing decision period -0.057*** -0.024* -0.053*** -0.022 0.032** 
P(Fisher) 0.027 0.249 0.114 0.418 0.112 
P(permute) 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.060 0.005 
contract modified during delivery -0.005 -0.003 -0.034*** -0.029*** 0.023*** 
P(Fisher) 0.678 0.765 0.013 0.028 0.001 
P(permute) 0.400 0.545 0.000 0.000 0.000 
contract extension(length/value) 
     
ref.cat.=c.length diff.<=0 AND c.value diff.<=0.001 
     
2=0<c. length d.<=0.162 OR 0.001<c.value d.<=0.24 -0.069** -0.063*** -0.017 -0.026 -0.011 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.524 0.269 0.445 
P(permute) 0.005 0.000 0.400 0.110 0.475 
3= 0.162<c. length diff. OR 0.24<c.value diff. -0.005 -0.015 0.022  0.011  -0.008 
P(Fisher) 0.842 0.468 0.367 0.605 0.523 
P(permute) 0.735 0.335 0.220 0.520 0.575 
4= missing (with contr. completion ann.) -0.01 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007* -0.001 
P(Fisher) 0.549 0.634 0.655 0.707 0.883 
P(permute) 0.190 0.340 0.260 0.395 0.825 
5= missing (NO contr. completion ann.) -0.01 -0.013* 0.005 0.007 0.005 
P(Fisher) 0.412 0.252 0.712 0.594 0.582 
P(permute) 0.100 0.030 0.480 0.255 0.380 
constant included in each regression; control variables: product market (cpv divisions); number of winners on the market (market 
defined by cpv level 4 & nuts 1) year of contract award; log real contract value; contract length; framework contract; issuer type, 
sector, and status (public or private) 
N 33440 36977 27067 30365 13019 
R2/pseudo-R2 0.1183 0.1101 0.1074 0.1024 0.2558 
 Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; clustered standard errors clustered by issuer for P(Fisher), Monte Carlo random 
permutation simulations for P(permute) (200 permutations) using stata 
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Table 16.  
Regression results on contract level, 2009-2012, average marginal effects 
reported for models 1-4 and unstandardized coefficients for model 5, nr. of 
winners >=110 
models 1 2 3 4 5 
Independent vars / dependent vars 
single 
received bid 
single 
received bid 
single valid 
bid 
single valid 
bid 
winner's 12 
month 
market 
share 
single received/valid bid 
    
0.034*** 
P(Fisher) 
    
0.000 
P(permute) 
    
0.000 
no call for tenders published in official journal 0.201*** 0.136*** 0.18*** 0.114*** 0.032 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.150 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.085 
procedure type 
     
ref. cat.=open procedure 
     
1=invitation procedure 0.066* 0.054*** 0.071** 0.05** -0.054* 
P(Fisher) 0.276 0.304 0.350 0.451 0.196 
P(permute) 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.030 
2=negotiation procedure 0.019* 0.023** 0.06*** 0.056*** 0.032*** 
P(Fisher) 0.328 0.208 0.009 0.009 0.051 
P(permute) 0.010 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3=other procedures 0.314*** 0.309*** 0.29*** 0.287*** 0.037*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 0.023** 0.037*** 0.009 0.02 -0.004 
P(Fisher) 0.235 0.062 0.685 0.376 0.741 
P(permute) 0.010 0.000 0.410 0.080 0.660 
length of eligibility criteria 
     
ref.cat.=length<-2922.125 
     
1= -2922.125<length<=520.7038 0.057*** 0.029* 0.016 -0.004 0.008 
P(Fisher) 0.081 0.345 0.620 0.896 0.565 
P(permute) 0.000 0.015 0.215 0.785 0.605 
2= 520.7038<length<=2639.729 0.122*** 0.093*** 0.075*** 0.056*** 0.02 
P(Fisher) 0.001 0.006 0.038 0.121 0.247 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.195 
3= 2639.729<length 0.136*** 0.107*** 0.078*** 0.052** 0.027* 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.003 0.047 0.178 0.140 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.035 
4= missing length 0.18*** 0.039*** 0.059** -0.009*** 0.018 
P(Fisher) 0.001 0.325 0.276 0.829 0.527 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.380 
short submission period 
     
ref.cat.=normal submission period 
     
1=accelerated submission period 0.021** 0.025*** 0.001 0.006 0.014 
P(Fisher) 0.116 0.062 0.966 0.715 0.177 
P(permute) 0.010 0.000 0.955 0.605 0.060 
2=exceptional submission period 0.064*** 0.086*** 0.025 0.062** 0.015 
P(Fisher) 0.063 0.006 0.550 0.120 0.660 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.310 0.005 0.585 
3=except. submission per. abusing weekend 0.122* 0.204*** 0.073 0.169** -0.027 
P(Fisher) 0.067 0.008 0.255 0.016 0.501 
P(permute) 0.010 0.000 0.150 0.005 0.765 
4=missing submission period 0.316*** 0.165*** 0.157*** 0.053* 0.004 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.273 0.907 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.885 
relative price of tender documentation 
     
ref.cat.= relative price=0 
     
1= 0<relative price<=0.0004014 0.012 -0.007 -0.022 -0.063*** 0.036 
P(Fisher) 0.720 0.765 0.502 0.029 0.168 
P(permute) 0.410 0.615 0.240 0.000 0.070 
2= 0.0004014<relative price<=0.0009966 0.03* 0.014 0.003 -0.04* 0.022 
P(Fisher) 0.349 0.555 0.934 0.146 0.269 
P(permute) 0.025 0.255 0.895 0.015 0.140 
3= 0.0009966<relative price<=0.0021097 0.048*** 0.032* 0.01 -0.029 -0.004 
P(Fisher) 0.123 0.193 0.717 0.258 0.834 
P(permute) 0.000 0.020 0.580 0.070 0.735 
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4= 0.0021097<relative price 0.102*** 0.069*** 0.057*** 0.009 -0.005 
P(Fisher) 0.001 0.005 0.032 0.707 0.768 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.540 0.700 
5=missing relative price 0.002 0.01 -0.011 -0.039*** -0.038*** 
P(Fisher) 0.965 0.687 0.717 0.146 0.033 
P(permute) 0.850 0.305 0.405 0.000 0.000 
call for tenders modified -0.023* -0.028*** -0.019 -0.02 0 
P(Fisher) 0.211 0.118 0.489 0.456 0.989 
P(permute) 0.025 0.000 0.125 0.095 0.990 
models 1 2 3 4 5 
weight of non-price evaluation criteria 
     
ref.cat.= only price 
     
2= 0<non-price criteria weight<=0.4 -0.013 -0.005 -0.047*** -0.031*** -0.008 
P(Fisher) 0.433 0.729 0.017 0.087 0.456 
P(permute) 0.085 0.425 0.000 0.000 0.270 
3= 0.4<non-price criteria weight<=0.556 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 
P(Fisher) 0.001 0.000 0.043 0.017 0.007 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4= 0.556<non-price criteria weight<1 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.112*** 0.102*** 0.077*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5=only non-price criteria 0.011 0.014 0.01 0.005 -0.004 
P(Fisher) 0.486 0.355 0.631 0.795 0.751 
P(permute) 0.310 0.115 0.525 0.675 0.720 
procedure annulled and re-launched 
 
-0.076*** 
 
-0.025 
 
P(Fisher) 
 
0.007 
 
0.445 
 
P(permute) 
 
0.000 
 
0.100 
 
length of decision period 
     
ref.cat.= 44<decision period<=182 
     
1= decision period<=32 0.03*** 0.033*** 0.084*** 0.089*** 0.005** 
P(Fisher) 0.044 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.688 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.610 
2= 32<decision period<=44 0.023* 0.019* 0.024* 0.03** 0.01 
P(Fisher) 0.167 0.212 0.173 0.051 0.441 
P(permute) 0.025 0.035 0.015 0.005 0.305 
4= 182<decision period 0.116*** 0.143*** 0.138*** 0.159*** 0.055*** 
P(Fisher) 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.013 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5= missing decision period -0.082*** -0.035*** -0.084*** -0.038*** 0.016 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.088 0.020 0.177 0.461 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.440 
contract modified during delivery 0 0.001 -0.027*** -0.023** 0.022*** 
P(Fisher) 0.973 0.922 0.065 0.102 0.015 
P(permute) 0.945 0.835 0.000 0.005 0.000 
contract extension(length/value) 
     
ref.cat.=c.length diff.<=0 AND c.value diff.<=0.001 
     
2=0<c. length d.<=0.162 OR 0.001<c.value d.<=0.24 -0.052** -0.048** 0.006 -0.01 -0.022 
P(Fisher) 0.012 0.012 0.856 0.719 0.252 
P(permute) 0.005 0.005 0.775 0.580 0.225 
3= 0.162<c. length diff. OR 0.24<c.value diff. -0.028 -0.035* 0.007  -0.005  -0.023 
P(Fisher) 0.311 0.119 0.813 0.858 0.192 
P(permute) 0.130 0.025 0.715 0.790 0.185 
4= missing (with contr. completion ann.) 0.001 0.002 0.015 0.015 0 
P(Fisher) 0.961 0.900 0.495 0.457 0.995 
P(permute) 0.945 0.830 0.240 0.195 0.985 
5= missing (NO contr. completion ann.) -0.004 -0.009 0.011 0.011 -0.01 
P(Fisher) 0.767 0.454 0.490 0.416 0.372 
P(permute) 0.655 0.195 0.240 0.190 0.220 
constant included in each regression; control variables: product market (cpv divisions); number of winners on the market (market 
defined by cpv level 4 & nuts 1) year of contract award; log real contract value; contract length; framework contract; issuer type, 
sector, and status (public or private) 
N 22276 25813 18273 21584 7806 
R2/pseudo-R2 0.1442 0.1272 0.1274 0.1148 0.2448 
Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; clustered standard errors clustered by issuer for P(Fisher), Monte Carlo random 
permutation simulations for P(permute) (200 permutations) using stata 
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Annex C – List of political offices considered for political 
connection measurement 
The full list of institutions and positions can be obtained from the data provider, the 
government owned MTI Hungarian News Agency, which maintains a database of the most 
significant political office holders of the country for more than 20 years. 
For more information see: http://mkk.mti.hu/  
Table 17.  
List of institutions and positions of the political office holder database,  
2010-2011 
Institution Position 
Ministries 
minister, secretary of state, vice-secretary of state, 
ministerial councillor,  
Constitutional court members and leaders 
County courts president, vice- president 
Supreme court President, vice-president, spokesperson 
Prosecutors' Office Chief prosecutor, vice-chief prosecutor, spokesperson 
Municipalities Major, vice-major, notary 
County governments (new 
“kormányhivatal” too) president, vice-president, notary 
Regional police Chief 
National police headquarters Chief, vice-chief, spokesperson 
Minority governments president, vice-president, head of office head of secretary 
National medical service Chief doctor, chief pharmacist 
National Healthcare Fund Director, vice-director 
Army headquarters Marshal, Vice-marshal 
Treasury President, vice-president, head of finances 
Tax Administration President, vice-president, spokesperson 
Office of the president President of the state, heads of every bureau of the office 
State Audit Office President, vice-president, chief director, director of finances 
Regional Development Councils presidents, member of governing committee 
Office of the parliament Head of office, heads of offices 
Ombudsmen offices Ombudsmen, heads of offices 
National headquarters of Prisons National chief, national vice-chief,  
Competition Authority President, vice-president, head of secretary 
Central statistical office president, vice-president 
Other regulatory agencies and 
background institutes 
top-management (2-3 positions) 
 
 
 
 
 
